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Abstract
Nonmonotonic consequence is the subject of a vast literature, but the idea of a nonmonotonic
counterpart of logical inconsistency—the idea of a defeasible property representing internal conflict
of an inductive or evidential nature—has been entirely neglected. After considering and dismissing
two possible analyses relating nonmonotonic consequence and a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical
inconsistency, this paper offers a set of postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency, an analysis of
nonmonotonic inconsistency in terms of nonmonotonic consequence, and a series of results showing
that nonmonotonic inconsistency conforms to these postulates given the analysis of nonmonotonic
inconsistency presented here and certain postulates for nonmonotonic consequence.
The results presented here establish the interest of certain previously undiscussed postulates of
nonmonotonic consequence. These results also show that nonmonotonicity, which has never seemed
useful in the formulation of general principles governing nonmonotonic reasoning, is relevant to the
positive characterization of nonmonotonic inference after all.
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In classical logic, the concept of logical consequence is correlated in a straightforward
and familiar way with the concept of logical inconsistency. And, like logical consequence,
logical inconsistency is monotonic. That is, just as condition MLC below holds for logical
consequence, so condition MLI holds for logical inconsistency:1
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1 We shall use p and q to range over sentences and X and Y to range over sets of sentences. We shall use the
expression ‘X ’ to mean that X is logically inconsistent.
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MLC If X ⊆ Y and X  p, then Y  p.
MLI If X ⊆ Y and X , then Y .
Research in artificial intelligence has paid considerable attention to nonmonotonic
conceptions of consequence, i.e., conceptions of consequence for which analogs of MLC
do not hold.2 The idea of a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency, by
contrast, has been entirely neglected. Does logical inconsistency have such a counterpart:
a defeasible property capturing internal conflict of an inductive or evidential nature? If so,
then is this counterpart related to nonmonotonic consequence in anything like the way that
logical inconsistency is related to logical consequence?
The answers to these questions turn out to be yes and no, respectively. I shall expand on
these answers by presenting a formal theory of a nonmonotonic analog of inconsistency.
Section 1 poses the technical problem to be solved in this paper by exploring and ruling out
two obvious ways to link nonmonotonic analogs of logical consequence and inconsistency.
Section 2 considers what requirements a satisfactory notion of nonmonotonic inconsistency
might be expected, in the abstract, to satisfy. Section 3 presents a formal analysis of
nonmonotonic inconsistency, and Section 4 investigates how this analysis stands with
respect to the postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency presented in Section 2. Along
the way in Section 4 we apply several of the results proved there by identifying some
of the postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency that are satisfied by certain versions of
default logic, certain versions of preferential entailment, and certain Poole systems.
1. Two roads not worth taking
Assume as given a language L with the unary operator ¬ (Boolean negation) and
the binary operator ∨ (Boolean inclusive disjunction), and assume a compact monotonic
consequence relation  on L that satisfies the deduction theorem and includes at least
two-valued classical truth-functional logic. We shall assume that any other truth-functional
connectives mentioned below have been defined in terms of disjunction and negation, and
we shall define the classical consequence set Cn(X) for a set X as follows:
Definition 1. Cn(X)=df {p: X  p}.
Given a consequence relation as described just above, which we shall refer to throughout
the paper as ‘classical consequence’, inconsistency and consequence are interdefinable:
ALI X  iff there is a p such that X  p and X ¬p.
ALC X  p iff X ∪ {¬p} .
2 A complete list of references on the subject of nonmonotonic reasoning would be very long indeed, and
I shall not attempt to include such a list here. I will say that the writing of this paper was most influenced by
[2,4–6]. It will be convenient to have in mind a concrete sample of systems of nonmonotonic consequence for
reference later in this paper. Since the systems reviewed in [6] are so exhaustively characterized there, I shall
(with one exception) restrict my examples to systems reviewed in [6] and refer the reader to [6] for details.
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Neither of these equivalences turns out to be tenable if classical consequence and classical
inconsistency are replaced by counterparts both of which are nonmonotonic and both of
which satisfy a very small number of intuitively compelling postulates.
Consider first ANI, which is the nonmonotonic counterpart of ALI. The expression
‘X |∼ p’ shall mean that p is a nonmonotonic consequence of X (under some given def-
inition of nonmonotonic consequence) and ‘X |∼’ shall mean that X is nonmonotonically
inconsistent (under some given definition of nonmonotonic inconsistency):
ANI X |∼ iff there is a p such that X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p.
One principle relating nonmonotonic consequence to logical consequence for a number of
systems of nonmonotonic consequence is Consistency Preservation:
CP If X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p, then X .
Equivalently, if X is classically consistent, then so is the set of its nonmonotonic
consequences. The class of systems of nonmonotonic consequence which satisfy CP
include such examples as default logic with normal defaults,3 Poole systems without
constraints,4 and complete classical stoppered preferential entailment.5 Even some systems
of nonmonotonic consequence which are not built on classical logic satisfy a version
of CP, for example, the Horty–Thomason–Touretzky theory of multiple inheritance with
exceptions.6
Now, it is reasonable to suppose that whatever nonmonotonic inconsistency turns out
to be, classical inconsistency will be a special case of it. That is, Supraclassicality for
Nonmonotonic Inconsistency is a principle that may reasonably be expected to govern
nonmonotonic inconsistency:
SupNI If X  then X |∼.
The problem with ANI is that ANI, CP, and SupNI together reduce nonmonotonic
inconsistency to classical inconsistency:
Proposition 1. If ANI, CP, and SupNI hold for all X and p, then, for all X, X |∼ if and
only if X .
Proof. SupNI states that X |∼ if X . ANI and CP directly imply that X |∼ only if X . ✷
3 See [8] and the discussion of consistency preservation for default logic in [6, p. 59]. Here and throughout
the rest of this paper we shall mean skeptical default inference whenever the term ‘default logic’ is used (see [6,
Section 2.3, pp. 52–53]).
4 See [7] and Observation 3.3.3 in [6, p. 68].
5 See the discussion of consistency preservation and complete classical stoppered preferential entailment in
[6, p. 81]. A preferential model 〈M, |=,<〉 is complete iff for every set X that is maximally consistent (relative to
) there is an m ∈M such that X = {p: m |= p}.
6 See Theorem 5.1 and the discussion of “soundness” in [3, pp. 324–326].
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Since our project is to identify a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency, and
since SupNI seems a reasonable requirement, I conclude that a reasonable nonmonotonic
counterpart of logical inconsistency cannot be defined via ANI for any system of
nonmonotonic consequence that obeys CP. Since some of the most well-motivated systems
of nonmonotonic consequence in the literature do obey CP, and since CP is itself a well-
motivated requirement (though I shall not argue the point here), I conclude that ANI is
simply untenable as an analysis of a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency.
Of course, this does not mean that the property which ANI does define—the property of
being a set whose nonmonotonic consequences are classically inconsistent—is not or has
not been useful in the discussion of nonmonotonic consequence. My point, rather, is that
given CP and SupNI, ANI cannot give us what we are looking for, namely a property of
sets of statements which is, among other things, nonmonotonic.7
A consequence analogous to Proposition 1 follows if a nonmonotonic counterpart of
ALC is assumed in place of ANI:
ANC X |∼ p iff X ∪ {¬p} |∼.
One perfectly reasonable postulate for a nonmonotonic consequence relation is Reflexivity:
RNC If p ∈X then X |∼ p.
Reflexivity follows directly from another reasonable principle, namely Supraclassicality
for Nonmonotonic Consequence:
SupNC If X  p then X |∼ p.
But if ANC is combined with CP and SupNC, then nonmonotonic consequence is reduced
to classical consequence:
Proposition 2. If CP, ANC, and SupNC hold for all X and p, then, for all X and p, X |∼p
if and only if X  p.
Proof. Assume CP, ANC, and SupNC. By SupNC it will suffice to show that X |∼p only
if X  p. Suppose X |∼ p. By ANC, X ∪ {¬p} |∼. But X ∪ {¬p} = (X ∪ {¬p}) ∪ {¬p},
hence (X ∪ {¬p}) ∪ {¬p} |∼. By ANC it follows that X ∪ {¬p} |∼ p. By RNC, which
follows from SupNC, we have that X ∪ {¬p} |∼ ¬p, so, by CP, we have that X ∪ {¬p} .
By classical logic, it follows that X  p. So X |∼ p only if X  p, as required. ✷
7 It might be argued that since the property of having classically inconsistent nonmonotonic consequences has
played a role in the literature on nonmonotonic consequence, nonmonotonic inconsistency has not been entirely
neglected after all. I agree that the property of having classically inconsistent nonmonotonic consequences has
not been neglected. What Proposition 1 shows is that, given SupNI, attention to the latter property does not count
as attention to a nonmonotonic counterpart of classical inconsistency for systems of nonmonotonic consequence
that obey CP.
C.B. Cross / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 161–178 165
Like Proposition 1, Proposition 2 applies to default logic with normal defaults,8 Poole
systems without constraints,9 and complete classical stoppered preferential entailment,10
since all of these systems satisfy not only CP but SupNC, as well.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that, at least for systems of nonmonotonic consequence
which satisfy CP, the relationship between nonmonotonic consequence and any genuinely
nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency will not be as straightforward as one
might have expected.
2. Nonmonotonic inconsistency, classical consequence, and nonmonotonic
consequence
Since the most obvious candidate definitions of nonmonotonic inconsistency and
nonmonotonic consequence in terms of one another did not give us what we were
looking for, let us take a different approach. What requirements besides SupNI might
a satisfactory notion of nonmonotonic inconsistency be expected, in the abstract, to
satisfy? The following seem to be possibilities and concern in part the relation between
nonmonotonic inconsistency and classical consequence:
WeakCMNI If X |∼ and X  p then X ∪ {p} |∼.
WeakTrNI If X ∪ {p} |∼ and X  p then X |∼.
Cases1NI If X ∪ {p} |∼ and X ∪ {q} |∼ then X ∪ {p ∨ q} |∼.
Cases2NI If X ∪ {p} |∼ and X ∪ {¬p} |∼ then X |∼.
What WeakCMNI states is that the nonmonotonic inconsistency of a set is always
preserved when one of its classical consequences is added. This is a kind of weak
cautious monotony principle for nonmonotonic inconsistency. A stronger version will be
considered below. WeakTrNI, on the other hand, is a kind of weak transitivity principle
for nonmonotonic inconsistency. If we define a set X to be nonmonotonically consistent
iff X |∼ , then WeakTrNI is equivalent to the claim that the nonmonotonic consistency of
a set is always preserved when one of its classical consequences is added. Cases1NI and
Cases2NI can be thought of as principles for reasoning about nonmonotonic inconsistency
by cases.
SupNI and the four postulates presented just above are not independent, as the following
results show.
8 See the discussion of supraclassicality for extension families in [6, pp. 52–53], which applies to default logic
with normal or non-normal defaults.
9 Supraclassicality is proved for Poole systems with or without constraints in [6, Observation 3.3.1, pp. 66–
67].
10 Classical preferential entailment is always supraclassical (see [6, p. 88]) since in a classical preferential
model, if p ∈ Cn(X) and state m preferentially satisfies X, then m satisfies X and so must satisfy p because the
model is classical.
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Proposition 3. If WeakTrNI and Cases1NI hold for all X, p, and q , then Cases2NI holds
for all X and p.
Proof. Assume WeakTrNI and Cases1NI, and suppose that X ∪ {p} |∼ and X ∪ {¬p} |∼.
By Cases1NI it follows that X ∪ {p ∨¬p} |∼. But, by classical logic, X  p ∨¬p, hence
by WeakTrNI X |∼. ✷
Proposition 4. If SupNI and Cases2NI hold for all X and p, then WeakTrNI holds for all
X and p.
Proof. Assume SupNI and Cases2NI and suppose that X  p and X ∪ {p} |∼. Then, by
classical logic, X ∪ {¬p} . Since by SupNI it follows that X ∪ {¬p} |∼, by Cases2NI we
have that X |∼. ✷
We might also suspect that stronger versions of WeakCMNI and WeakTrNI will be of
interest, namely
StrongCMNI If X |∼ and X |∼ p then X ∪ {p} |∼.
StrongTrNI If X ∪ {p} |∼ and X |∼ p then X |∼.
These principles imply WeakCMNI and WeakTrNI, respectively, if SupNC is assumed.
StrongCMNI and StrongTrNI are reminiscent of the principles of Cautious Monotony and
Cumulative Transitivity that are familiar features of Cumulative Reasoning:11
StrongCMNC If X |∼ q and X |∼p then X ∪ {p} |∼ q .
StrongTrNC If X ∪ {p} |∼ q and X |∼ p then X |∼ q .
Another question of interest, raised by Proposition 2, is the issue of the nonmonotonic-
ity of nonmonotonic inconsistency. Under what conditions can we be assured that non-
monotonic inconsistency is in fact nonmonotonic? In the case of nonmonotonic conse-
quence, it suffices to assume CP and
NonTrivNC There exist X and p such that X |∼ p but X  p.
The following is then easily proved:12
Proposition 5. If NonTrivNC holds and if RNC and CP hold for all X and p, then there
are X, Y , and p, such that X⊆ Y and X |∼ p, but Y |∼p.
11 See [2,4–6]. Cautious Monotony and Cumulative Transitivity are identified here as “strong” principles
because later in this paper we shall identify some weaker variants.
12 This proof is adapted from the proof of Lemma 3 in [1, p. 242].
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Proof. Assume RNC, CP, and NonTrivNC. Consider X and p such that X |∼p but X  p.
Assume for reductio that X ∪ {¬p} |∼p. Since X ∪ {¬p} |∼¬p by RNC, it follows by CP
that X ∪ {¬p} . But in that case, X  p, contrary to hypothesis. ✷
An analogous result for nonmonotonic inconsistency can be obtained based not on a
counterpart of CP but rather on a thesis of Optimism for Nonmonotonic Inconsistency:
OptNI For every X such that X , there exists a Y such that X ⊆ Y and Y |∼ .
That is, every logically consistent set has a nonmonotonically consistent extension.
A principle of nontriviality for nonmonotonic inconsistency is also needed for the result:
NonTrivNI There is an X such that X |∼ but X .
We may now easily prove the following:
Proposition 6. If OptNI and NonTrivNI hold, then there are X, Y such that X ⊆ Y and
X |∼ but Y |∼ .
Proof. Assume OptNI and NonTrivNI. By NonTrivNI, let X be such that X |∼ but X .
By OptNI, since X , there is a Y such that X ⊆ Y and Y |∼ . ✷
Having now seen some plausible postulates for a nonmonotonic analog of logical
inconsistency, let us turn, with these postulates in mind, to the problem of giving an analysis
of nonmonotonic inconsistency.
3. A theory of nonmonotonic inconsistency
The fact that, given CP and SupNI, a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical inconsistency
cannot be defined via ANI poses the question whether any such counterpart exists for
systems of nonmonotonic consequence that obey CP. If nonmonotonic inconsistency is not
the property of having contradictory nonmonotonic consequences, then what is it? We shall
answer this question below. Then, in Section 4, we shall discuss how our analysis stands
with respect to the postulates for nonmonotonic inconsistency presented in Section 2.
We have seen why ANI cannot give us what we are looking for, but what was it about
ANI that made it worth looking at in the first place? Clearly, it was the fact that ANI
captures a notion of internal conflict. The problem with ANI was the fact that conflict in the
sense of ANI is too much like the conflict that is characteristic of classically inconsistent
sets. If there is a nonmonotonic counterpart of classical inconsistency to be found, it
must be based on a notion of internal conflict that applies in the more general context of
nonmonotonic consequence. Now, one of the characteristics of a system of nonmonotonic
reasoning is that it provides mechanisms for resolving some of the conflicts that arise when
a single set of premises contains subsets that support conflicting conclusions. Consider the
familiar example of Tweety the penguin:
168 C.B. Cross / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 161–178
The Tweety Example. The facts are ‘Tweety is a penguin’ and ‘All penguins are birds’;
the rules are ‘Penguins normally do not fly’ and ‘Birds normally fly’.
In this example, the singleton premise set {‘Tweety is a bird’} supports the conclusion
‘Tweety flies’, whereas {‘Tweety is a penguin’, ‘All penguins are birds’} supports ‘Tweety
does not fly’. Reasonable systems of nonmonotonic consequence resolve this conflict in
favor of the conclusion ‘Tweety does not fly’ on the grounds that the property of being a
penguin is more specific than the property of being a bird and an argument from a more
specific property preempts an argument from a less specific property. But not every case of
conflict can be resolved by specificity or in any other way.
Classically inconsistent sets are one class of examples of unresolved conflict. If two
subsets of a set X logically entail contradictory consequences p and ¬p, respectively,
then the monotonicity of classical consequence ensures that X as a whole cannot resolve
the conflict, since p and ¬p will both be classical consequences of X. Another class of
cases of unresolved conflict consists of those cases in which two opposing conclusions
are defeasibly supported by arguments which cancel each other out, so that the set as a
whole supports neither of the two conflicting conclusions. This phenomenon is illustrated
by another familiar example:
The Nixon Diamond. The facts are ‘Nixon is a Quaker’ and ‘Nixon is a Republican’; the
rules are ‘Quakers are normally pacifists’ and ‘Republicans are normally non-pacifists’.
In this example, the singleton premise set {‘Nixon is a Quaker’} supports the conclusion
‘Nixon is a pacifist’, but {Nixon is a Republican’} supports the conclusion ‘Nixon is not
a pacifist’. Having no reason to prefer one of these arguments to the other given just the
facts and rules in the Nixon Diamond, a reasonable system of nonmonotonic consequence
draws no conclusion concerning whether Nixon is a pacifist.13 What is common to both
kinds of unresolved conflict—cases of logical inconsistency and cases in which conflicting
arguments cancel each other out—is the fact that the set as a whole does not support exactly
one of the pair of contradictory conclusions supported, respectively, by a certain pair of its
subsets. This suggests the following analysis of nonmonotonic inconsistency:
Definition 2. X |∼ iff there is a p such that, for some Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and
Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p, and X |∼ p iff X |∼ ¬p.
In other words, X is nonmonotonically inconsistent just in case its classical conse-
quences include sets Y1 and Y2 which nonmonotonically support, respectively, a pair of
conflicting conclusions neither or both of which is supported by X itself. The conflict is
unresolved in that X itself does not support exactly one of the two conflicting terms p and
13 There are possible accounts of nonmonotonic consequence on which one would conclude from the Nixon
Diamond that Nixon both is and is not a pacifist. My own view is that such accounts are not reasonable, but the
definition of nonmonotonic inconsistency presented below does not assume this.
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¬p.14 Definition 2 states that Y1 and Y2 are subsets of Cn(X) rather than subsets of X
because in a language containing boolean connectives, it is possible that X may contain
the conjunction of the members of the premise sets Y1 and Y2 without including Y1 and Y2
as subsets.
To illustrate Definition 2, consider again the Nixon Diamond, which is nonmonotoni-
cally inconsistent assuming a reasonable account of nonmonotonic inference. In particular,
we can choose p, Y1, and Y2 as follows:
p = ‘Nixon is a pacifist’,
Y1 = {‘Nixon is a Quaker’},
Y2 = {‘Nixon is a Republican’}.
Whereas, relative to the rule set {‘Quakers are normally pacifists’, ‘Republicans are
normally non-pacifists’}, Y1 supports p and Y2 supports ¬p, Y1 ∪ Y2 supports neither.
The Nixon Diamond also illustrates the nonmonotonicity of nonmonotonic inconsistency
as defined by Definition 2. Whereas Y1 ∪ Y2 is nonmonotonically inconsistent, some of its
supersets are not, for example Y1 ∪ Y2 ∪ {‘All Republicans are Quakers’}.
4. Some results for this analysis
Of course, many of the properties of nonmonotonic inconsistency under Definition 2
will be determined by the assumptions one makes about nonmonotonic consequence. If we
assume that nonmonotonic consequence is both consistency preserving and supraclassical,
then the concept defined in Definition 2 can be recharacterized as follows:
Proposition 7. Given CP, SupNC, and Definition 2, X |∼ iff either X  or there is a p such
that, for some Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but
X |∼p and X |∼¬p.
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and Definition 2. Suppose that X |∼. Then there is a p such
that, for some Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but
X |∼ p iff X |∼¬p. If X , then by CP we have not both X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p, in which
case X |∼p and X |∼¬p. So, as required, either X  or there is a p such that, for some
Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and
X |∼¬p. Conversely, suppose that either X  or there is a p such that, for some Y1 and
Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p.
14 Of course, the fact that the conflict is unresolved in X does not prevent X or Cn(X) from having subsets
in which the conflict is resolved. That is, one could have a situation which satisfies the terms of Definition 2 but
where there is a subset Y of Cn(X) such that Y1 ⊆ Y and Y2 ⊆ Y and either both Y |∼ p and Y |∼¬p or both
Y |∼p and Y |∼¬p. Indeed, there could be a chain of such Y s going up toward X. This should not be surprising,
nor does it indicate a problem with Definition 2. Where the nonmonotonic inconsistency of X is at issue (rather
than the nonmonotonic inconsistency of Y ), the relevant consideration is whether the “total evidence” represented
by X resolves the issue between p and ¬p. The fact that the “partial evidence” represented by subset Y favors p
or favors ¬p is neither here nor there.
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There are two cases. Suppose (Case 1) that X . Then for some p, X  p and X  ¬p,
so by SupNC, X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p. The right-hand side of Definition 2 is satisfied if we
let Y1 = Y2 = X. Suppose (Case 2) that there is a p such that, for some Y1 and Y2, where
Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p. In this case
it follows immediately that the right-hand side of Definition 2 is satisfied. So in either case
the right-hand side of Definition 2 is satisfied. ✷
Thus, if nonmonotonic consequence satisfies Consistency Preservation and Supraclas-
sicality, then a set is nonmonotonically inconsistent if and only if either it is classically
inconsistent or it has subsets which support conflicting conclusions that cancel each other
out (as in the Nixon Diamond). One direct consequence of Proposition 7 is the following:
Proposition 8. CP, SupNC, and Definition 2 imply SupNI.
Since default logic with normal defaults, Poole systems without constraints, and com-
plete classical stoppered preferential entailment satisfy both CP and SupNC, Proposition 8
shows that nonmonotonic inconsistency satisfies SupNI for each of these systems.
Even weaker assumptions about nonmonotonic consequence suffice to yield the princi-
ple of Optimism for Nonmonotonic Inconsistency (OptNI). Consider the following:15
Proposition 9. If RNC holds, then for all X, if X is maximally consistent relative to ,
then X |∼ .
Proof. Assume RNC and suppose X is maximally consistent relative to . Assume for
reductio that X |∼. Then there exist Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) and p such that Y1 |∼p and Y2 |∼¬p
and X |∼p iff X |∼¬p. By the Negation Completeness of maximally consistent sets, p ∈X
or ¬p ∈X, but not both. By RNC, X |∼ p or X |∼ ¬p but not both, which contradicts the
fact that X |∼ p iff X |∼ ¬p. ✷
Thus no maximally consistent set is nonmonotonically inconsistent. But then we have
the following:
Proposition 10. If RNC holds, then so does OptNI.
Proof. Assume RNC and X . By Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there is a Y such that X ⊆ Y
and Y is maximally consistent relative to . By Proposition 9, Y |∼ . ✷
15 I shall adopt the following definition of maximal consistency: a set X is maximally consistent relative to 
iff X  and for all p, if p /∈X then X∪{p} . In the proofs of Propositions 9 and 10 I shall assume without proof
the following facts, where  is a monotonic consequence relation which extends two-valued truth-functional logic
and satisfies both compactness and the deduction theorem:
Negation Completeness. If X is maximally consistent relative to , then for all p, either p ∈X or ¬p ∈X, but
not both.
Lindenbaum’s Lemma. If X  then there is a Y ⊇X such that Y is maximally consistent relative to .
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In short, if we assume Reflexivity for nonmonotonic consequence, then no logically
consistent set is so fraught with unresolved conflict that it cannot be extended to a set that
is free of such conflict, since every logically consistent set can be extended to a maximally
consistent set, and no maximally consistent set exhibits unresolved conflict. The class of
systems of nonmonotonic consequence satisfying RNC (and whose associated notion of
nonmonotonic inconsistency therefore satisfies OptNI) is very wide; indeed, among those
systems of nonmonotonic consequence which are taken seriously in the literature I know
of no example for which RNC fails.
Consider next the following weak transitivity principle for nonmonotonic consequence:
WeakTrNC If X ∪ {p} |∼ q and X  p, then X |∼ q .
Given WeakTrNC, CP, and SupNC, it is not difficult to prove the corresponding weak
cautious monotonicity property for nonmonotonic inconsistency:
Proposition 11. Given Definition 2, if CP, SupNC, and WeakTrNC hold for all X, p, and
q , then WeakCMNI holds for all X and p.
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and WeakTrNC, and suppose that X |∼ and X  p. By
Proposition 7, either (i) X  or else (ii) there are Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) such that for some
q , Y1 |∼ q and Y2 |∼ ¬q but X |∼q and X |∼¬q . In case (i), X ∪ {p}  follows by
classical logic, hence by Proposition 8 we have that X ∪ {p} |∼. Alternatively, suppose
that case (ii) obtains. Since X |∼q and X |∼¬q and X  p, it follows by WeakTrNC
that X ∪ {p} |∼q and X ∪ {p} |∼¬q . Since in addition Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) = Cn(X ∪ {p}),
it follows by Proposition 7 that q , Y1, and Y2 witness the truth of X ∪ {p} |∼. ✷
Another possible requirement on nonmonotonic consequence is the following weak
version of cautious monotony:
WeakCMNC If X |∼ q and X  p, then X ∪ {p} |∼ q .
And, given WeakCMNC together with CP and SupNC, it is not difficult to prove
WeakTrNI:
Proposition 12. Given Definition 2, if CP, SupNC, and WeakCMNC hold for all X, p,
and q , then WeakTrNI holds for all X and p.
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and WeakCMNC, and suppose that X∪{p} |∼ and X  p. By
Proposition 7 either (i) X ∪ {p}  or else (ii) there are Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X ∪ {p}) such that for
some q , Y1 |∼q and Y2 |∼¬q but X∪{p} |∼ q and X∪{p} |∼¬q . In case (i),X  follows by
classical logic, hence by Proposition 8 we have that X |∼. Alternatively, suppose that case
(ii) obtains. Since X ∪ {p} |∼q and X ∪ {p} |∼¬q and X  p, it follows by WeakCMNC
that X |∼q and X |∼¬q . Since in addition Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X ∪ {p}) = Cn(X), it follows by
Proposition 7 that q , Y1, and Y2 witness the truth of X |∼. ✷
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If CP and SupNC are dropped, we can prove the conjunction of WeakCMNI and
WeakTrNI provided that both WeakTrNC and WeakCMNC are assumed:
Proposition 13. Given Definition 2, if WeakTrNC and WeakCMNC hold for all X, p, and
q , then WeakCMNI and WeakTrNI hold for all X and p.
Proof. Assume WeakTrNC and WeakCMNC. First we prove WeakCMNI. Suppose that
X |∼ and X  p. By Definition 2, there are Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) such that for some q , Y1 |∼ q
and Y2 |∼ ¬q , and X |∼ q iff X |∼ ¬q . Then X ∪ {p} |∼ q iff X |∼ q (by WeakTrNC and
WeakCMNC) iff X |∼ ¬q iff X ∪ {p} |∼ ¬q (by WeakTrNC and WeakCMNC). Since in
addition Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) = Cn(X ∪ {p}), it follows by Definition 2 that q , Y1, and Y2
witness the truth of X ∪ {p} |∼. A similar argument proves WeakTrNI. ✷
WeakTrNC and WeakCMNC are direct consequences of the following principle (Right
Absorption):
RightAbs For all X, C(X)= C(Cn(X))
where C(X) (the closure of X under nonmonotonic consequence) is defined as follows:
Definition 3. C(X)=df {p: X |∼ p}.
Since default logic with normal or non-normal defaults,16 Poole systems with or without
constraints,17 and classical preferential entailment18 all satisfy RightAbs, Proposition 13
shows that nonmonotonic inconsistency satisfies WeakTrNI and WeakCMNI for these
systems.
Next we note that StrongCMNI follows if StrongTrNC, CP, and SupNC are assumed:
Proposition 14. Given Definition 2, if CP, SupNC, and StrongTrNC hold for all X, p, and
q , then StrongCMNI holds for all X and p.
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and StrongTrNC, and suppose that X |∼ and X |∼ p. By
Proposition 7, either (i) X  or else (ii) there are Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) such that for some
q , Y1 |∼ q and Y2 |∼ ¬q but X |∼q and X |∼¬q . In case (i), X ∪ {p}  follows by
classical logic, hence by Proposition 8 we have that X ∪ {p} |∼. Alternatively, suppose
that case (ii) obtains. Since X |∼q and X |∼¬q and X |∼ p, it follows by StrongTrNC
that X ∪ {p} |∼q and X ∪ {p} |∼¬q . Since in addition Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X)⊆ Cn(X ∪ {p}), it
follows by Proposition 7 that q , Y1, and Y2 witness the truth of X ∪ {p} |∼. ✷
16 See Observation 3.2.2 in [6, p. 59].
17 Poole systems satisfy RightAbs because they are both cumulative and supraclassical [6, Observation 3.3.1,
p. 66] and because all cumulative supraclassical consequence relations satisfy RightAbs [6, Observation 2.2.1,
p. 45].
18 See [6, p. 88]. Classical preferential entailment satisfies RightAbs because in a classical preferential model,
a state m preferentially satisfies X iff m preferentially satisfies Cn(X).
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Since default logic with normal defaults,19 Poole systems without constraints,20 and
complete classical stoppered preferential entailment21 all satisfy StrongTrNC (as well
as CP and SupNC), Proposition 14 shows that StrongCMNI holds for nonmonotonic
inconsistency relative to these systems.
Our success in proving Propositions 11, 12, 13, and 14 might lead one to expect
to be able to show that our strong transitivity principle (StrongTrNI) for nonmonotonic
inconsistency follows from Consistency Preservation (CP), Supraclassicality (SupNC), and
Cautious Monotony (StrongCMNC), but things are not so straightforward. CP, SupNC,
and StrongCMNC may be reasonable principles of nonmonotonic inference, but they are
apparently not sufficient for StrongTrNI. To obtain a condition that is sufficient, let us
define the notion of a point of unresolved conflict as follows:
Definition 4. A statement p is a point of unresolved conflict for a set X iff for some
Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p, and X |∼ p iff X |∼ ¬p.
This gives us the following immediate consequence:
Proposition 15. X |∼ iff there is a point of unresolved conflict for X.
If we assume that nonmonotonic consequence is both consistency preserving and
supraclassical, then the notion of a point of unresolved conflict can be recharacterized
as follows:
Proposition 16. Given CP, SupNC, and Definition 4, p is a point of unresolved conflict for
X iff either X  or there are Y1 and Y2 such that Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y1 |∼p
and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p.
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and Definition 4. Let p be a point of unresolved conflict for
X. If X , then we are done, so suppose X . Since p is a point of unresolved conflict for
X, there are Y1 and Y2 such that Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p
but X |∼ p iff X |∼ ¬p. Since X , CP implies that not both X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p. Hence
X |∼p and X |∼¬p. So, as required, either X  or there are Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X)
and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p.
Conversely, suppose that either X  or p is such that for some Y1 and Y2, where
Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p. There are
two cases. Suppose (Case 1) that X . Then X  p and X  ¬p, so by SupNC, X |∼ p
and X |∼ ¬p. The right-hand side of Definition 4 is then satisfied if we let Y1 = Y2 = X.
Suppose (Case 2) that for some Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p
and Y2 |∼ ¬p but X |∼p and X |∼¬p. In this case it follows immediately that the right-
19 StrongTrNC is proved for default logic with normal or non-normal defaults in [6, Observation 3.2.1, p. 58].
20 StrongTrNC follows from cumulativity, which is proved for Poole systems with or without constraints in [6,
Observation 3.3.1, pp. 66–67].
21 StrongTrNC is proved for preferential entailment in [6, Observation 3.4.2, p. 73].
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hand side of Definition 4 is satisfied. So in either case the right-hand side of Definition 4 is
satisfied. ✷
The main case in our proof of Proposition 14 was a proof that if Consistency
Preservation (CP), Supraclassicality (SupNC), and Cumulative Transitivity (StrongTrNC)
hold for nonmonotonic consequence, then X |∼ p implies that every point of unresolved
conflict for X is a point of unresolved conflict for X ∪ {p}. This is a strong “cautious
monotony” principle for unresolved conflict. Analogously, a kind of “transitivity” principle
for unresolved conflict (TrUC below) will suffice for StrongTrNI. The idea behind TrUC
is that if q is a point of unresolved conflict for X ∪ {p} and X |∼ p, then removing p from
X ∪ {p} should not be enough to resolve the conflict.
TrUC For all p, q , and X, if q is a point of unresolved conflict for X ∪ {p} and X |∼ p,
then q is a point of unresolved conflict for X.
Based on TrUC we have the following:
Proposition 17. Given Definition 2, if TrUC holds for all X, p, and q , then StrongTrNI
holds for all X and p.
Proof. Assume TrUC, and suppose that X∪{p} |∼ and X |∼p. By Proposition 15, X∪{p}
has a point of unresolved conflict q . By TrUC, q is a point of unresolved conflict for X.
Hence X |∼ by Proposition 15. ✷
Analogous results are available for Cases1NI and Cases2NI based on postulates
Cases1UC and Cases2UC given below. The idea of Cases1UC is that if X∪{p} andX∪{q}
both have points of unresolved conflict, then from these points of unresolved conflict it
should be possible to construct a point of unresolved conflict for X ∪ {p ∨ q}. The idea of
Cases2UC is that if X ∪ {p} and X ∪ {¬p} both have points of unresolved conflict, then
the conflict presumably has nothing to do with p, so that X itself must have some point of
unresolved conflict that is not resolved in X ∪ {p} or in X ∪ {¬p}.22
Cases1UC If X ∪ {p} and X ∪ {q} both have points of unresolved conflict, then so does
X ∪ {p ∨ q}.
Cases2UC If X ∪ {p} and X ∪ {¬p} both have points of unresolved conflict, then they
have a common point of unresolved conflict which is also a point of unresolved conflict
for X.
Given these cases principles, the following results are easily derived:
22 The intuitive appeal of TrUC, Cases1UC, and Cases2UC appears to come directly from intuitions about
evidential conflict and its resolution, rather than from intuitions about nonmonotonic consequence, but, given
Definition 2, intuitions of the former type have implications for nonmonotonic consequence. Thus it is possible
to learn something about nonmonotonic consequence by thinking about evidential conflict and its resolution.
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Proposition 18. Given Definition 2, if Cases1UC holds for all X, p, and q , then Cases1NI
holds for all X, p, and q .
Proof. Assume Cases1UC, and suppose that X∪{p} |∼ and X∪{q} |∼. By Proposition 15
X∪ {p} and X ∪ {q} each have a point of unresolved conflict. It follows by Cases1UC that
X∪{p∨q} has a point of unresolved conflict, hence X∪{p∨q} |∼ by Proposition 15. ✷
Proposition 19. Given Definition 2, if Cases2UC holds for all X and p, then Cases2NI
holds for all X and p.
Proof. Assume Cases2UC, and suppose that X ∪ {p} |∼ and X ∪ {¬p} |∼. By Proposi-
tion 15, X ∪ {p} and X ∪ {¬p} both have points of unresolved conflict. It follows by
Cases2UC that X ∪ {p}, X ∪ {¬p}, and X share a common point of unresolved conflict.
Hence by Proposition 15, X |∼, as required. ✷
Cases2UC and Cases2NI turn out to have application in certain results concerning the
nonmonotonic analog of maximal consistency:
Definition 5. X is maximally nonmonotonically consistent relative to |∼ iff X |∼ and for
all p, if p /∈X then X ∪ {p} |∼.
Maximally nonmonotonically consistent sets, if such sets exist, will be so full of
information that they are on the verge of containing unresolved conflict. Are there such
sets?
Proposition 20. If CP and SupNC hold, then every set that is maximally consistent relative
to  is maximally nonmonotonically consistent relative to |∼.
Proof. Assume CP and SupNC, and let X be maximally consistent relative to . Then
RNC holds, so by Proposition 9 we have X |∼ . Let p /∈X. Then X∪{p} , by the maximal
consistency of X. By Proposition 8, we have X ∪ {p} |∼, as required. ✷
Are there any maximally nonmonotonically consistent sets that are not maximally
consistent? Not if CP, SupNC, and Cases2UC hold:
Proposition 21. If CP, SupNC, and Cases2UC hold, then every set that is maximally
nonmonotonically consistent relative to |∼ is maximally consistent relative to .
Proof. Assume CP, SupNC, and Cases2UC, and let X be maximally nonmonotonically
consistent relative to |∼. Then X |∼ , so, by Proposition 8, X . Suppose for reductio that X
is not maximally consistent relative to . Since X , there exist p and ¬p such that p /∈X
and ¬p /∈X. Since X is maximally nonmonotonically consistent, we have X ∪ {p} |∼ and
X ∪ {¬p} |∼. By Proposition 19, Cases2NI holds, so we have X |∼, which contradicts the
maximal nonmonotonic consistency of X. ✷
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Propositions 20 and 21 imply that maximal nonmonotonic consistency and maximal
consistency come to the same thing given Consistency Preservation, Supraclassicality for
Nonmonotonic Consequence, and Cases2UC.
The results proved in this section begin to give us a picture of how the properties
of nonmonotonic inconsistency as defined in Definition 2 depend on the properties of
the nonmonotonic consequence relation in terms of which nonmonotonic inconsistency
is defined. The picture is not complete, but, quite apart from that, there is a final worry
that deserves attention: Why should the property defined in Definition 2—the property of
having a point of unresolved conflict—be thought of as any sort of inconsistency? Why not
reserve the label ‘inconsistency’ for the property of having contradictory consequences,
since having contradictory consequences is one thing and having a point of unresolved
conflict is another? The answer is this: ‘inconsistency’ is an appropriate label for the
property of having a point of unresolved conflict because the notion of inconsistency
originates in classical logic, and, in classical logic, a set is inconsistent iff it has a point of
unresolved conflict. This follows from the fact that, in classical logic, a set has a point of
unresolved conflict iff it has contradictory consequences:
Proposition 22. Suppose that X |∼ p iff X  p, for all X and p, i.e., suppose that the
relational |∼ denotes classical consequence. Then X |∼ (i.e., X satisfies Definition 2) iff
there is a p such that X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p.
Proof. Assume X |∼ p iff X  p, for all X and p. Suppose that X |∼. Then there is a p
such that, for some Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ⊆ Cn(X) and Y2 ⊆ Cn(X), Y1 |∼ p and Y2 |∼ ¬p,
and X |∼p iff X |∼¬p. But then Y1  p and Y2 ¬p, so by the monotonicity of , X  p
and X  ¬p. Hence X |∼ p and X |∼ ¬p, as required. Conversely, suppose X |∼ p and
X |∼¬p. Then X |∼ follows by Definition 2 if we let Y1 = Y2 =X. ✷
Since having a point of unresolved conflict and having contradictory consequences
are coextensive properties in classical logic, both properties have a claim on being an
explication of the term ‘inconsistency’ not only in classical logic but in systems of
consequence that generalize classical logic. In the context of nonmonotonic consequence,
the property of having contradictory consequences and the property of having a point of
unresolved conflict come apart, so in that context at least two non-coextensive properties
have a claim on the label ‘inconsistency’. But while both of these non-coextensive
properties should be regarded as species of inconsistency, still, in light of Propositions 1
and 6, our interest in identifying a nonmonotonic conception of inconsistency (i.e., an
analog of inconsistency which is itself nonmonotonic) justifies our attention to the one
property rather than the other.
5. Conclusion
We have seen that Definition 2 identifies a notion of nonmonotonic inconsistency which
satisfies the postulates identified as plausible in Section 2 given certain assumptions about
nonmonotonic consequence:
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• The Nixon Diamond shows that NonTrivNI is consistent with Definition 2 for
appropriately skeptical systems of nonmonotonic consequence.
• Given reasonable assumptions about nonmonotonic consequence we can prove
– SupNI (Proposition 8);
– OptNI (Proposition 10);
– WeakCMNI (Propositions 11 and 13);
– WeakTrNI (Propositions 12 and 13);
– StrongCMNI (Proposition 14);
– StrongTrNI (Proposition 17);
– Cases1NI (Proposition 18);
– Cases2NI (Proposition 19).
And, based on these results and the results in [6], we have seen that nonmonotonic
inconsistency exhibits the following properties for the following extant systems of
nonmonotonic consequence:
• Default logic
– with normal or non-normal defaults: OptNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI;
– with normal defaults only: OptNI, SupNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI, StrongCMNI.
• Poole systems
– with or without constraints: OptNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI;
– without constraints: OptNI, SupNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI, StrongCMNI.
• Preferential entailment
– classical: OptNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI;
– complete classical stoppered: OptNI, SupNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI, Strong-
CMNI.
In each case, satisfaction of RNC accounts for a system’s satisfying OptNI; RightAbs
likewise accounts for WeakTRNI and WeakCMNI; CP and SupNC jointly account for
SupNI; and CP, SupNC, and StrongTrNC jointly account for StrongCMNI.
Let us conclude by considering what reasons there are for thinking that it will be fruitful
to pay attention to nonmonotonic inconsistency as defined in Definition 2.
One reason is this: our discussion of nonmonotonic inconsistency has uncovered
plausible general principles for nonmonotonic inference that make essential reference to
the notion of unresolved conflict that underlies Definition 2. The postulates in question
are TrUC, Cases1UC, and Cases2UC. It remains to be seen how these postulates may be
related to cumulativity and to extant systems of nonmonotonic inference.
A second reason for paying attention to nonmonotonic inconsistency has to do with
the fact that nonmonotonicity itself has never seemed to be a useful property to use in
the formulation of general principles of nonmonotonic consequence. Indeed, the most
well-worked out general treatment of nonmonotonic consequence, namely the theory of
cumulative inference,23 makes no implicit or explicit mention of nonmonotonicity in its
23 See [2,4,5].
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positive characterization of nonmonotonic consequence. Our discussion of nonmonotonic
inconsistency, however, exploits the notion of unresolved conflict, and Proposition 16
shows that if CP and SupNC hold then unresolved conflict can be defined in terms of
certain instances of nonmonotonicity. Accordingly, if CP and SupNC hold then even
very general principles of nonmonotonic consequence which, like TrUC, Cases1UC, and
Cases2UC, make reference to unresolved conflict also make reference, at least implicitly,
to the nonmonotonicity of nonmonotonic consequence. The study of nonmonotonic
inconsistency has therefore revealed that nonmonotonicity is relevant to the positive
characterization of nonmonotonic inference after all.
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